Standards & Trust
Built on government cryptography standards
Throndar signs with the post-quantum signature algorithms NIST standardized — one of which the NSA CNSA 2.0 suite also names — and designs its council pipeline around the NIST AI Risk Management Framework. Below is the full primitive-to-standard mapping, with every source linked.
- NIST PQC algorithms
- One algorithm in common with CNSA 2.0
- NIST AI RMF aligned
- No certification claimed
Post-quantum cryptography
NIST-standardized, today
Transport is whatever TLS the hosting platform and runtime negotiate with each client — the protocol version, cipher suite and key-agreement group are theirs, not Throndar's; Throndar runs no key exchange of its own. Measured 2026-11-14 and 2026-11-15, the hosting platform's TLS endpoint for throndar.ai and www.throndar.ai negotiates the hybrid post-quantum key-agreement group X25519MLKEM768 with clients that offer it; offered alone, the classical groups X25519, P-256, P-384 and P-521 each also completed a handshake; ML-KEM-1024 is not offered. The same endpoint accepts TLS 1.3 and TLS 1.2, refuses TLS 1.0 and TLS 1.1, prefers the cipher suite TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 and presents an RSA certificate. Its post-quantum contribution is the signatures: an ML-DSA-87 (FIPS 204, final) receipt on signed-in council answers; Falcon-1024 (Round 3; not FN-DSA) and SLH-DSA-SHA2-256f (FIPS 205, final) co-signatures that the model-plane bridge puts on every answer it signs; and an SLH-DSA co-signature on the web layer's own receipts, Autopilot receipts and transparency-log tree heads when that leg is enabled.
- Signatures: ML-DSA-87 (FIPS 204) plus a Falcon-1024 (Round 3; not FN-DSA) co-signature, from two lattice families (Module-LWE and NTRU).
- Falcon is an addition; FN-DSA (FIPS 206) is selected by NIST but not yet published — Throndar makes no FIPS 206 claim.
- The Falcon-1024 co-signature is Falcon Round 3, not FN-DSA: NIST has not yet published FIPS 206 (FN-DSA), not even a draft, and has announced that its signing procedure will differ (its 2026-09-28 plan for FN-DSA specifies fixed-point-only signing).
- Verifiable provenance: a signed-in council answer is ML-DSA-87-signed into a tamper-evident receipt you can verify in your own browser at /verify/receipt — unless the model plane did not state how it was made, in which case it is delivered without one.
National-security algorithm overlap
One algorithm in common with the CNSA 2.0 suite
ML-DSA-87 is the general-purpose signature algorithm the NSA CNSA 2.0 suite names; the suite also names a key-encapsulation algorithm and the stateful hash-based signatures LMS and XMSS, which Throndar does not run itself. One algorithm choice in common — not suite alignment, not a certification.
- One algorithm choice in common with the CNSA 2.0 suite (ML-DSA-87) — not suite alignment, not a certification.
- Throndar's post-quantum layer is its signatures, not its transport.
- Falcon is an added second signature, described separately and NOT part of CNSA 2.0.
“One algorithm in common with the CNSA 2.0 suite” describes an algorithm choice. Throndar claims no CNSA 2.0 conformance, holds no NSA approval, and is not approved for National Security Systems.
AI governance
A council pipeline designed around the NIST AI RMF
Throndar's council pipeline is designed around the NIST AI Risk Management Framework (NIST AI 100-1, January 2023) and its Generative AI Profile (NIST AI 600-1, July 2024): a prompt goes to several frontier models, their drafts are cross-examined and fused into one answer — aimed at the generative-AI risks the profile names, confabulation and information integrity — and the receipt signs a record of how the answer was made (council_synthesised, synthesis_fallback or single_model). No step grades or approves an answer before it ships. The architecture is designed around the practices in the NSA/CISA/FBI joint guidance “Deploying AI Systems Securely” (April 15, 2024): strict access controls, monitoring, and a hardened deployment environment.
- The governance flag records how each signed answer was made and is bound into its signature; that record, the receipts and the public ledger are the evidence this design offers against the AI RMF's Govern, Map, Measure and Manage functions — self-attested, not an assessment.
- Designed against the OWASP Top 10 for LLM Applications (2025), including LLM01 prompt injection, with multi-model cross-review.
- Wording is deliberate: 'aligned with / designed around', never a certification or audit claim.
The mapping
Primitive → standard, every source linked
Each row maps a Throndar primitive to the public standard it's built on or aligned with. Identifiers link to the issuing body.
| Throndar primitive | Standard · identifier | Body | Status |
|---|---|---|---|
| Primary message signature — ML-DSA-87 | ML-DSA · FIPS 204 | NIST | Finalized Aug 2024 · category 5 |
| Second / dual signature — Falcon-1024 (Round 3; not FN-DSA) | FN-DSA · FIPS 206 | NIST | Selected — standard forthcoming, not yet published; Throndar's co-signature is Falcon Round 3, not FN-DSA |
| National-security algorithm overlap — ML-DSA-87 | CNSA 2.0 algorithm suite · NSA CSI | NSA | One algorithm in common (not suite alignment, not a certification) |
| AI governance pipeline — Govern · Map · Measure · Manage | AI Risk Management Framework 1.0 · NIST AI 100-1 | NIST | Aligned / operationalized |
| Governed council vs. confabulation + information integrity | Generative AI Profile · NIST AI 600-1 | NIST | Aligned |
| Secure-AI deployment — access controls, monitoring, hardened env | Deploying AI Systems Securely · Joint CSI | NSA / CISA / FBI | Designed around the practices |
| LLM input/output + prompt-injection defenses | Top 10 for LLM Applications 2025 (LLM01) · OWASP | OWASP (industry) | Designed against |
| SLH-DSA (hash-based signatures) | SLH-DSA · FIPS 205 | NIST | Finalized Aug 2024 · co-signs the bridge's answers; a deployment switch on the web layer |
Throndar implements NIST-standardized post-quantum signature algorithms; one of them (ML-DSA-87) is also named by the NSA CNSA 2.0 algorithm suite, and its council pipeline is designed around the NIST AI Risk Management Framework. Throndar is not FIPS 140-3 validated, holds no CMVP or NSA validation, claims no CNSA 2.0 conformance, and makes no certification claim. FN-DSA (FIPS 206) is a forthcoming NIST standard that is not yet published, and Throndar's Falcon-1024 co-signature is Falcon Round 3, not FN-DSA. SLH-DSA (FIPS 205) is an additional, non-authoritative diversity co-signature: the model-plane bridge adds it to every answer it signs, and the web layer adds it to its own receipts and tree heads when that leg is enabled (THRONDAR_SLHDSA_LEG, a deployment switch that is off unless set). Standards alignment is self-attested.