Throndar

Security

Security at the apex

Post-quantum by design, governed end to end, and verifiable in your browser against published keys.

Post-quantum layer

Built for the quantum era

Transport is whatever TLS the hosting platform and runtime negotiate with each client — the protocol version, cipher suite and key-agreement group are theirs, not Throndar's; Throndar runs no key exchange of its own. Measured 2026-11-14 and 2026-11-15, the hosting platform's TLS endpoint for throndar.ai and www.throndar.ai negotiates the hybrid post-quantum key-agreement group X25519MLKEM768 with clients that offer it; offered alone, the classical groups X25519, P-256, P-384 and P-521 each also completed a handshake; ML-KEM-1024 is not offered. The same endpoint accepts TLS 1.3 and TLS 1.2, refuses TLS 1.0 and TLS 1.1, prefers the cipher suite TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 and presents an RSA certificate. Its post-quantum contribution is the signatures: an ML-DSA-87 (FIPS 204, final) receipt on signed-in council answers; Falcon-1024 (Round 3; not FN-DSA) and SLH-DSA-SHA2-256f (FIPS 205, final) co-signatures that the model-plane bridge puts on every answer it signs; and an SLH-DSA co-signature on the web layer's own receipts, Autopilot receipts and transparency-log tree heads when that leg is enabled.

Governance pipeline

How a council answer is made

A council answer is normally synthesised from several seats of the thirteen-model roster. When only one seat answered, or the synthesis failed, the signed receipt records it (council-grounded: false).

Key handling

Secrets never enter chat

The web layer's receipt keys are derived in-process with HKDF-SHA256 from a server-side environment secret. The model-plane bridge loads its own ML-DSA-87 and Falcon-1024 secret keys from its environment and derives its SLH-DSA key from its ML-DSA-87 secret. Signing keys are never sent to the browser; only the public keys are published. There is no HSM or KMS: each key is only as secret as the environment secret it comes from. You verify answers against the published public keys.

Responsible disclosure

Report a vulnerability

Found a security issue? We want to hear from you. Email security@throndar.ai with details and clear steps to reproduce. We aim to acknowledge within 3 business days, we won't pursue good-faith research that respects user privacy and avoids data destruction, and we credit reporters who help us improve.

Signed-in council answers carry an ML-DSA-87 receipt, and the model plane co-signs the answers it produces with Falcon-1024; transport is the platform's TLS. ML-DSA-87 is one algorithm the NSA CNSA 2.0 suite names; Throndar is not FIPS 140-3 validated and holds no NSA approval — one algorithm in common, not a certification.

See the full primitive-to-standard mapping →