Security
Security at the apex
Post-quantum by design, governed end to end, and verifiable in your browser against published keys.
- NIST FIPS 204/205
- Governed & auditable
- Post-quantum signed answers
Post-quantum layer
Built for the quantum era
Transport is whatever TLS the hosting platform and runtime negotiate with each client — the protocol version, cipher suite and key-agreement group are theirs, not Throndar's; Throndar runs no key exchange of its own. Measured 2026-11-14 and 2026-11-15, the hosting platform's TLS endpoint for throndar.ai and www.throndar.ai negotiates the hybrid post-quantum key-agreement group X25519MLKEM768 with clients that offer it; offered alone, the classical groups X25519, P-256, P-384 and P-521 each also completed a handshake; ML-KEM-1024 is not offered. The same endpoint accepts TLS 1.3 and TLS 1.2, refuses TLS 1.0 and TLS 1.1, prefers the cipher suite TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 and presents an RSA certificate. Its post-quantum contribution is the signatures: an ML-DSA-87 (FIPS 204, final) receipt on signed-in council answers; Falcon-1024 (Round 3; not FN-DSA) and SLH-DSA-SHA2-256f (FIPS 205, final) co-signatures that the model-plane bridge puts on every answer it signs; and an SLH-DSA co-signature on the web layer's own receipts, Autopilot receipts and transparency-log tree heads when that leg is enabled.
- Signatures: ML-DSA-87 (FIPS 204, final) and a Falcon-1024 (Round 3; not FN-DSA) co-signature, from two lattice families (Module-LWE and NTRU).
- The Falcon-1024 co-signature is Falcon Round 3, not FN-DSA: NIST has not yet published FIPS 206 (FN-DSA), not even a draft, and has announced that its signing procedure will differ (its 2026-09-28 plan for FN-DSA specifies fixed-point-only signing).
- Transport: every prompt, token and media artifact travels over the TLS the hosting platform negotiates; Throndar adds no key exchange of its own.
Governance pipeline
How a council answer is made
A council answer is normally synthesised from several seats of the thirteen-model roster. When only one seat answered, or the synthesis failed, the signed receipt records it (council-grounded: false).
- Your prompt goes to every configured seat — the same prompt to each; nothing splits it or picks seats per part.
- Drafts that arrive within the draft window are cross-examined and fused into one synthesized answer by one seat.
- The answer's governance flag records how it was made — council_synthesised, synthesis_fallback or single_model — and the receipt signs that flag with the answer. No separate check grades or approves an answer before it ships.
- Which answers are signed: a council answer streamed to the signed-in console gets an ML-DSA-87 receipt when the model plane states how the answer was made. When that statement does not arrive, the answer is still delivered and its charge stands, with no receipt and no ledger entry. The free demo and the non-streaming API sign no receipt.
Key handling
Secrets never enter chat
The web layer's receipt keys are derived in-process with HKDF-SHA256 from a server-side environment secret. The model-plane bridge loads its own ML-DSA-87 and Falcon-1024 secret keys from its environment and derives its SLH-DSA key from its ML-DSA-87 secret. Signing keys are never sent to the browser; only the public keys are published. There is no HSM or KMS: each key is only as secret as the environment secret it comes from. You verify answers against the published public keys.
- Your secrets are never entered into chat.
- Server-side secrets are never exposed to the browser.
- Sessions are scoped and revocable.
Responsible disclosure
Report a vulnerability
Found a security issue? We want to hear from you. Email security@throndar.ai with details and clear steps to reproduce. We aim to acknowledge within 3 business days, we won't pursue good-faith research that respects user privacy and avoids data destruction, and we credit reporters who help us improve.
- Contact: security@throndar.ai — also published at /.well-known/security.txt (RFC 9116).
- In scope: throndar.ai and its APIs. Out of scope: volumetric denial-of-service, social engineering, and third-party services.
- Good-faith research under these terms is welcome — please don't access or modify other users' data.
Signed-in council answers carry an ML-DSA-87 receipt, and the model plane co-signs the answers it produces with Falcon-1024; transport is the platform's TLS. ML-DSA-87 is one algorithm the NSA CNSA 2.0 suite names; Throndar is not FIPS 140-3 validated and holds no NSA approval — one algorithm in common, not a certification.