Post-quantum posture
Cryptographic Bill of Materials
The PQC Migration Handbook (TNO / AIVD / CWI) tells organisations to start by publishing a cryptographic inventory — every primitive in use, its standard, and its role. So here is ours, in full. Throndar is designed and assessed against the NIST post-quantum standards (FIPS 204 / 205) — not a certification, and we make no “quantum-proof” claim. Just an honest, machine-readable account you can audit.
Cryptographic inventory
ML-DSA-87 · NIST FIPS 204 · NIST Cat 5
AUTHORITATIVE signing — the receipt on signed-in council answers + transparency-log Signed Tree Heads
lattice / Module-LWE · digital-signature · finalized 2024 · load-bearing
Falcon-1024 (Round 3; not FN-DSA) · Falcon Round 3 specification — not FN-DSA; FIPS 206 not yet published · NIST Cat 5
model-plane DIVERSITY co-signature — NON-authoritative
lattice / NTRU · digital-signature · Round 3, not a NIST standard · diversity-only (NOT load-bearing)
This is Falcon Round 3, not FN-DSA: NIST has not yet published FIPS 206, not even as a draft, and the library that implements it states that FN-DSA would most likely be backwards-incompatible with it. Security agencies do not yet recommend FN-DSA as a sole signature, and Falcon's floating-point Gaussian sampler raises a side-channel concern. Throndar keeps ML-DSA-87 as the only gate.
SLH-DSA-SHA2-256f · NIST FIPS 205 · NIST Cat 5
DIVERSITY co-signature, NON-authoritative — on every answer the model-plane bridge signs, and on the web layer's receipts and tree heads when that leg is enabled; lattice-INDEPENDENT (hash-based)
hash-based / stateless (SPHINCS+) · digital-signature · finalized 2024 · bridge: always · web layer: THRONDAR_SLHDSA_LEG switch
Hash-based, so a verifier who checks it does not rely on the lattice assumption ML-DSA and Falcon share; advisory only, since ML-DSA-87 is the only gate.
SHA-256 · NIST FIPS 180-4
answer digest · key thumbprint · transparency-log Merkle leaf/node
hash · finalized · load-bearing
SHA3-512 · NIST FIPS 202
model-plane message digest
hash · finalized
TLS 1.3 / 1.2 · RFC 8446 / RFC 5246
web and bridge transport — the hosting platform and runtime negotiate the protocol version, cipher suite and key-agreement group; Throndar configures none of them. Measured 2026-11-14 and 2026-11-15, the hosting platform's TLS endpoint for throndar.ai and www.throndar.ai negotiates the hybrid post-quantum key-agreement group X25519MLKEM768 with clients that offer it; offered alone, the classical groups X25519, P-256, P-384 and P-521 each also completed a handshake; ML-KEM-1024 is not offered. The same endpoint accepts TLS 1.3 and TLS 1.2, refuses TLS 1.0 and TLS 1.1, prefers the cipher suite TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 and presents an RSA certificate.
transport · in production
Posture
- Cryptographic agility
- ML-DSA-87 is the only gate; the Falcon (Round 3) and SLH-DSA co-signatures are advisory.
- No key exchange of its own
- Not applicable to Throndar's own code: it runs no key exchange of its own. Browser and bridge transport is the TLS the hosting platform negotiates, and the platform, not Throndar, chooses the key-agreement group.
- The Falcon (Round 3; not FN-DSA) hedge
- Falcon-1024 (Round 3; not FN-DSA) is a NON-authoritative diversity co-signature only; ML-DSA-87 is the sole gate. This matches agency guidance that FN-DSA should not yet be relied upon alone.
- Side-channel posture
- The signing library, @noble/post-quantum, states that it has no protection against side-channel attacks, and it has had no independent audit. Falcon's floating-point Gaussian sampler is a side-channel risk the handbook (§6.2.3) flags; the hash-based SLH-DSA leg has no such sampler. A formal third-party side-channel audit (handbook §6.5) is a stated next step, not yet completed.
- Security category
- The signatures use NIST category 5 parameter sets (ML-DSA-87, Falcon-1024, SLH-DSA-SHA2-256f). The answer digest and the transparency-log Merkle tree use SHA-256, whose collision resistance is the benchmark NIST uses for category 2, so the stack is not category 5 throughout.
Mapped to the handbook's 3-phase migration
- 1 · Diagnosis — this CBOM is our cryptographic inventory. Every signature in the answer-provenance layer is post-quantum; transport is the TLS the hosting platform negotiates, and Throndar adds no key exchange of its own.
- 2 · Planning — crypto-agility: ML-DSA-87 is the only gate, and the Falcon (Round 3) and SLH-DSA co-signatures are advisory, so either co-signature can be dropped or replaced without touching the gate.
- 3 · Execution — already done for new data: signed-in console answers are signed with post-quantum primitives today, and verifiable in your browser.
This is a transparency inventory, not a certification. Throndar is 'designed and assessed against' these public standards; it is NOT CMVP/FIPS-140 validated, and makes no 'quantum-proof' claim.
Need this for your own stack?
This page is our own CBOM. An Evidence Pack Express produces a signed report for your codebase — executive summary, A–F readiness grade, findings, CycloneDX 1.6 CBOM, and a migration plan. Self-attested and signature-verifiable; not a certification.
Learn more
- The NIST post-quantum standards, explained →
- What is a Cryptographic Bill of Materials (CBOM)? →
- Harvest now, decrypt later: the quantum threat, explained →
Machine-readable: /api/cbom · Verify an answer · Transparency ledger · Live keys